The Weakness of the Doctrine of Eternal Hell
Adapted from: The Hope of Universal Salvation in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Wacław Hryniewicz By Mariusz Majewski

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As was already mentioned above, the traditional magisterial teaching speaks of the eternity of hell and the immutability of the situation of the dead. Hryniewicz challenges this teaching and asks some interesting questions. In his view, the tragic vision of the duality and opposition between heaven and hell, good and evil, happiness and suffering as presented by traditional teaching must be challenged. What does it mean for God that some of his creation will be eternally damned? Will not the love of God and his desire to save all be fulfilled? If God wills all his creation to be saved, will he not be able to transform it, so that everyone will indeed accept his merciful forgiveness? Did not God create everything to be united with him? Can we accept eternal dualism instead of unity? How can evil exist eternally (Hryniewicz, Dlaczego 159)? For Hryniewicz all these questions are valid and need to be thought about. In his opinion, theology too many times has given the definitive and doctrinal answers that today are being questioned. The eschatological teaching of the Church was based on specific interpretations of the biblical texts. The doctrine of eternal hell was pronounced as a dogma by the Church. The doctrine of eternal hell made of Christianity the religion of fear and anxiety.

The pessimistic view of the end of human history begins with Saint Augustine, who in his major work, De civitate Dei (XXI, 12), wrote about a damned mass (massa damnata). Because of total corruption by sin, most of humanity will be damned. This doctrine turned Christianity into a religion of grave fear, anxiety and aggression toward sinful people. Joy was withdrawn from the life of Christians. A human being was viewed as a criminal, depraved and worthy of eternal punishment. Sin overwhelmed grace, forgiveness and mercy. God became distant, threatening, and according to some, even laughing at the damnation of humanity. Because of the division of Christianity and the reformation, it was taught that most of the Christians (heretics, schismatics, and, so called “bad Catholics”) were damned. Hryniewicz says:

Over the centuries the teaching about damnation and eternal Hell was an integral part of the Christian Churches’ pedagogy. The fear of death and the dread of Hell were regarded as an essential motive behind moral behavior. As a result Christian Good Tidings lost its credibility especially among non-believers and people distrustful of the Church. Christians themselves were becoming the people whose faces bore no signs of joy in the gift of redemption, as Nietzsche remarks sarcastically… The Roman Church’s doctrine, upheld over the centuries, on the damnation of non believers and members of other religions and denominations was following the biblical warnings of Hell and a state of being lost. These warnings were transformed into the assertion about the real existence of eternal Hell. They were applied to concrete groups of people. The part of biblical statements which gave hope for salvation and redemption
was completely ignored (Hryniewicz, “Can” 63).

In the Christian tradition there have been even texts that expressed joy and happiness for the damnation and suffering of the sinners. This way of thinking has its roots in Jewish apocalyptic. One of the characteristics of apocalyptic writings is their pessimistic view of human history which is viewed as a history of sin, degeneration and rejection of God. There is a radical difference between this sinful world and the future world which will be radically different. Sinners will not have a place in this new world and only the chosen ones will be saved. One can see here already the elements of the exclusivist understanding of salvation. The doctrine of eternal hell was supposed to deter people from sinning. Waclaw Hryniewicz says that it created “pedagogy of fear”. It was supposed to help people in conversion and penance. God was pictured as a terrible judge who would justly repay and punish for every evil. Tertullian in De spectaculis
expressed joy over all the damned and suffering in hell that will be experienced by all the saved in heaven. They will watch and rejoice over the torments of the damned. Can this “pedagogy of fear” be successful in bringing people closer to God? Can this terrible God who is looking indifferently on the sufferings of the condemned be the merciful God of Jesus Christ? Can the joy over the damned be reconciled with the commandment of love of our enemies (Hryniewicz, Dlaczego 188)? Saint Augustine noticed in De civitate dei the same problem and criticized
those who were too merciful and who wanted the damned to be saved:

I must now, I see, enter the lists of amicable controversy with those tender-hearted Christians who decline to believe that any, or that all of those whom the infallibly just Judge may pronounce worthy of the punishment of hell, shall suffer eternally, and who suppose that
they shall be delivered after a fixed term of punishment, longer or shorter according to the amount of each man’s sin. In respect of this matter, Origen was even more indulgent; for he believed that even the devil himself and his angels, after suffering those more severe and prolonged pains which their sin deserved, should be delivered from their torments, and associated with the holy angels. But the Church, not without reason, condemned him for this and other errors… Very different, however, is the error we speak of which is dictated by the tenderness of these Christians who suppose that the sufferings of those who are condemned in the judgment will be temporary, while the blessedness of all who are sooner or later free will be eternal… Let, then, this fountain of mercy be extended, and flow forth even to the lost angels, and let them also be set free, at least after as many and long ages as seem fit! Why does this stream of mercy flow to all the human race, and dry up as soon as it reaches the angelic? And yet they dare not extend their pity further, and propose the deliverance of the devil himself (444-445).

Saint Augustine sarcastically speaks of all of these Christians who are “merciful” and want the sufferings of the damned to be temporal and not eternal or even the devil himself to be saved. He goes on to say that:

Their human tenderness is moved only towards men, and they plead chiefly for their own cause, holding out false hopes of impunity to their own deprived lives by means of this quasi compassion of God to the whole race (City of God 447).

Now Christians that hope for the temporal damnation of sinners are accused not only of being “too merciful” but also of self interest and egoism.

Hryniewicz notices the weak points of the doctrine of eternal hell. He shows that the punishment of eternal damnation would be unjust, not proportionate and not understandable because this punishment lacks the possibility of improvement and rehabilitation of the person. The idea of eternal hell is a total negation of educational and rehabilitative aspects of punishment. There is no doubt, writes Hryniewicz, that a person should be punished for the sins and offences committed, but the temporal offence committed in time does not deserve eternal punishment whatsoever. The punishment must be proportionate to the offence. In the case of eternal hell, one cannot speak of the proportionality of this punishment. The punishment is administered just for the sake of punishment. Furthermore, Hryniewicz says that theology teaches that a person cannot “earn” salvation and eternal life, but that salvation is the gift of God. About hell, on the other hand, the theology has taught that it is “earned” justly by the sinner. Thus, heaven is a gift whereas hell is just a payback. It seems that God uses two different measures: on the one hand there is non earned heaven, on the opposite side well-deserved hell. Philosophically, says Hryniewicz, one does not deserve eternal punishment because it would be not proportionate to the crime committed. Hell then would be terrible punishment just for the sake of punishment. The point is that from the perspective of human understanding of the goal of punishment, the sanction of eternal hell has the elements of only negative and repressive functions of the punishment. From the ethical point of view, the punishment is only successful if it changes the person for better and encourages the process of conversion and change of life. In the case of eternal hell, this process is impossible. Thus the eternal sufferings of hell exclude the possibility of conversion or change of life (Hryniewicz, Nadzieja 176-184). Hryniewicz not only expresses his critique of the dogma of eternal hell, but also proposes his own understanding of Gehenna (as he calls hell is accord with the biblical texts), as temporal and not eternal punishment. Therefore Hryniewicz proposes a different interpretation of the biblical texts that speak of the possibility of eternal damnation. Is it possible, he asks, to interpret these texts differently than traditional theology and see the hope for the salvation of all?